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Friday, June 03, 2005


The Opposition’s Achilles’ Heel


The opposition is not as irreproachable as many would want it to be. It has some serious questions to answer if it wants to win the hearts and minds of the majority of the Lebanese.

Yesterday, the opposition had an emergency meeting to discuss the aftermath of Samir kassir’s killing. Sensing that the Syrians are creeping back in through the cracks of Lebanese politicking and pie-slicing, it decided to restore the glory and unity of the good’ol March-14 days. The gathering came with all the bells and whistles one would expect from their meetings: It was held in le Bristol where the movement was born, the Politicians were wearing the trademark red and white scarves, and it was attended by the Likes of Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblat, Gebran Tueni, Nassib Lahhoud and other heavyweights. It ended with the usual press conference, where three members (always selected to showcase their diversity) read out the findings to an enormous crowd of national and international journalists. In short, it was nothing short of a spectacle, worthy of the best of history books to come.

But how clear is that picture? Does the opposition really have that absolute moral high ground?

The opposition’s narrative, as reflected in their findings yesterday and in today’s newspapers, is simple and goes like this: The Lebanese people was united on March 14 under the banner of freedom, sovereignty and opposition to the security regime. We have recently lost track because we obtained some of what we were asking for (namely the Syrian military withdrawal and the rolling of some security heads), so we strayed and focused on minor issues like election alliances. But Samir Kassir’s killing came as a wake-up call for us to restore our unity and finish the battle we started, by getting rid of the head of the security apparatus, which is president Lahhoud himself.

Fair enough, but consider the following spoilers:

-The Patriarch Sfeir, an opposition godfather, is against the removal of president Lahhoud.

-Aoun, to use Annahar’s terminology, was “sacked” from the opposition consensus because he was making deals with the remnants of the Syrian/Lebanese security regime.

-The Lebanese media is no longer unanimous in its support for the opposition as Aoun is getting some sympathy from the likes of LBC, New Tv and Albalad newspaper. This was reflected in some of yesterday’s skeptical (not to say hostile) questions to the opposition’s Elias Atallah.

The question on the minds of a lot of Lebanese is this: why is the opposition losing ground? How come the crowd of March 14 got scattered?

To get a clue, this question from LBC’s reporter to the opposition is revealing (I’m paraphrasing):
You say that Aoun has left the opposition because he allied himself with remnants of the Syrian era like Sleimen Franjiyeh, Talal Arselan and Michel el Murr. But the opposition is doing the same: aren’t Walid Jumblat and Saad Hariri making deals with Amal and Hezbollah? What’s the difference, aren’t they also the remnants of the Syrian regime?

Attalah answered by referring to some obscure opposition document that the FPM has signed in Moukhtara, which stipulated that Allying with Amal and Hezbollah is legitimate, because of their “representational and strategic” importance.

Needless to say, a lot of Lebanese won’t buy that. You’re either with us or with the Terrorist as George bush would put it. Beside, don’t Sleimen Franjyieh and Michel el Murr also have legitimate representations?

In Fact, the strategic decision that the opposition took to avoid confrontation with the two main Shia groups is part of a Realpolitik approach that they had deemed most effective. Their plan was this: we’ll get rid of the Syrians and Lahhoud first, then, when we’re the majority in parliament, we get rid of Nabih Berri and we’ll pacify Hezbollah.

This logic would have quietly passed if it weren’t for the arrival of general Aoun, who is asking questions a lot of Lebanese secretly are.

The problem with the opposition is mainly a problem of marketing; Michel Aoun is having inroads in the Lebanese hearts and minds because he has an appealing and simple message: “they’re all bad, they’re all corrupt, I’m different, I have all along called for the Syrians to go, unlike the so-called opposition”

To face that, the March-14 opposition has to simplify its message and be honest with the Lebanese voter. The voter needs a good and simple explanation of why they are allying with Amal and Hezbollah, and it has better be convincing.